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REVIEWABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS ON LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AFTER
FRANKL7N rv MASSACHUSETTS
INTRODUCI'ON

In order to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),' federal agencies must include a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) "in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 2 Despite NEPA's
broad provisions designed to safeguard the environment, it falls to
provide citizens a private right of action that would allow them to challenge agency noncompliance and to enforce NEPA provisions. Thus,
litigants can gain judicial review only if they comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),3 which enables people who are adversely
affected by agency action to obtain judicial recourse. Yet, in order to
gain judicial review under the APA, litigants must demonstrate that
4
the federal agency action they challenge is a "final agency action."
The Supreme Court's recent construction of this finality requirement
in Franklin v. Massachusetts states that the "final" agency action must
"directly affect" the parties.5 Although Franklinwas not a NEPA case,
the lower courts' application of its direct effects finality requirement
to NEPA cases will make access to courts all the more difficult for
future environmental litigants to obtain.
In particular, Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative,6 a recent D.C. Circuit decision, demonstrates that a court's
application of the Franklin finality requirement to NEPA cases could
effectively eliminate judicial review of an agency's failure to comply
with NEPA's EIS requirement in an entire category of actions. Most
litigation regarding NEPA's EIS provision has involved its second
prong, which requires an EIS for "major Federal actions." Thus,
NEPA's EIS requirement for legislative proposals, the first prong, remains somewhat of a "forgotten clause." 7 In Public Citizen, however,
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1988)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
3 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (1988).
4 5 U.S.C. § 704.
5 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773-76 (1992).
6 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
7 Ian M. Kirschner, Note, NEPA's ForgottenClause: Impact Statementsfor LegislativePoposals, 58 B.U. L REv. 560, 561 (1978). See also Comment, Impact Statements on Legislative
1
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the clause came briefly into the national spotlight. In that case, several environmental groups brought an action against the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) for failing to prepare an
EIS on a proposal for legislation that would implement the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).8 Environmental groups
achieved a short-lived success in a district court ruling requiring the
USTR to prepare an EIS; 9 the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's
opinion, however, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 10
The D.C. Circuit, applying the Franklinstandard of finality, found
that the USTR's preparation of NAFTA without an EIS failed to constitute "final agency action" under the APA." The court's reliance on
the finality requirement proved a convenient way to avoid judicial review of an important question. This Note explores the need for clarification of the finality doctrine with respect to NEPA's EIS
requirement. It argues that courts should be able to review an
agency's failure to prepare an EIS on a legislative proposal, even if the
President has the ultimate constitutional authority over the action, as
was the case with NAFTA. An agency's failure to adhere to NEPA's
EIS requirement should constitute a "final agency" action, thus alProposals: Enforcing the Neglected Half of NEPA's Mandate, 7 EuvrL. L.

REP.

10145 (1977)

(commenting on how little judicial attention is given to the EIS requirement on proposals
for legislation).
8
InJune 1991, the United States, Mexico and Canada entered into trilateral negotiations to establish a North American free trade zone. See 56 Fed. Reg. 32,454-55 (July 16,
1991). On September 18, 1992, President Bush officially notified Congress of his intent to
sign NAFTA. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (Sept. 18, 1992). On October 7, 1992, the USTR initialed the final NAFIA text and President Bush signed the Agreement on December 17,
1992. At the time of Public Citizen, President Clinton had not yet submitted the NAFTA
legislation to Congress. The Trade Acts require Congress to follow fast-track procedures
during the NAFTA approval process. Thus, Congress had 90 days following the President's
submission of the legislation in which to either adopt or reject NAFTA. See 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2191-2903 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Following widespread public concern during the trilateral negotiations that a free
trade agreement might have harmful environmental effects in the U.S.-Mexico border
area, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued a report, Review of U.S.-Mexico
EnvironmentalIssues. This report characterized the general environmental concerns posed
by a trade agreement, but did not specifically assess the impact of a final trade agreement
on the environment. Thus, the USTR never contended that this report satisfied NEPA's
EIS requirement. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Public Citizen v. United States
Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 93-560), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685
(1994) [hereinafter Public Citizen Cert. Petition].
Congress passed NAFTA in November, 1993. It could have a significant impact on the
environment, including increased air pollution in all three countries and further decreases
in air and water quality as a result of increased trade development along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Id.
9 Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
10
The Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment. 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
The Court probably felt the issue was moot because Congress already had passed NAFTA
by the time they acted on the certiorari petition.
11 Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 533.
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lowing courts jurisdiction under the APA. Contrary holdings, which
extend a strict Franklin articulation of "finality" to NEPA cases, as the
D.C. Circuit did in Public Citizen, renders NEPA's EIS requirement for
legislative proposals unenforceable and moot.
In Part I, this Note provides background information regarding
NEPA and the APA. In addition, it discusses the manner in which
courts dealt with the finality issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts.12 Finally, it fleshes out three current
models courts use to either apply or distinguish Franklinin the NEPA
context. Inconsistencies in the various courts' applications of Franklin
in both NEPA and non-NEPA cases demonstrate the need to identify
an appropriate test for finality and clarify its application to cases regarding EISs on legislative proposals.
In Part II, this Note argues that courts should not apply Franklin's
APA finality requirement in the NEPA context, as the court did in
Public Citizen. Part II.A discusses NEPA's purposes, its legislative history, and the APA's legislative history, each of which strongly supports
a presumption of judicial review of an agency's failure to comply with
NEPA's mandates. Part II.B argues that the APA's "final agency action" requirement, if properly interpreted and applied, is not an obstacle to obtaining judicial review of an agency's independent
statutory obligations.
Furthermore, Part II.C disputes the proposition that the constitutional mandate of separation of powers necessitates the elimination of
judicial review of agency action in situations where the President has
the ultimate decisionmaking authority. Finally, Part II.D proposes an
analytical model whereby courts define the challenged action under
the APA as the combination of an agency's completion of a recommendation on a proposal and its concomitant failure to include an
EIS. This model best serves NEPA's goals, as discussed in Part II.A,
and maintains the appropriate balance of power between the three
branches.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 as one of the first major pieces
of federal environmental legislation. It evolved from a growing concern that agencies ignored the environmental effects of their decisions.13 The Act declared a national environmental policy to
"encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
12
13

112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
DANIEL RL MANDELKR, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION at ix (2d ed. 1994).
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environment" and to "enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation." 14 It created the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to accomplish this goal.' 5
In addition, it mandated a number of "action-forcing provision [s],"16
requiring, for instance, that all federal agencies file an EIS on all legislative proposals and major federal actions that significantly affect the
environment.' 7 These provisions guaranteed that environmental concerns would become a significant factor in the policy-making process.
The CEQ promulgated regulations to implement NEPA in
1978.18 In order to facilitate the Executive Branch's intent that these
regulations simplify the EIS process and make it more useful to decisionmakers and the public by "reduc[ing] paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data,"' 9 the CEQ has defined
"federal agency," "legislation," "major federal action" and "proposal."20 In addition, the CEQ regulations give a detailed description of
both the process an agency must follow in preparing an EIS and the
actual content of an EIS. 2' Courts have consistently deferred to the
22
CEQ's interpretation of NEPA.
NEPA introduced several procedural devices, such as the EIS requirement in section 102(c) and the development of alternatives requirement in section 102(d), to effectuate its national environmental
policies. 23 As a result, federal agencies must generate information regarding the environmental effects of their legislative proposals and
14 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
15 Id.
16 M. Diane Barber, Bridging the Environmental Gap: The Application of NEPA to the Meico-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement, 5 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 429, 434-35 (1992).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c).
18 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1994). Exec. Order No. 11,991 granted CEQ the authority
to promulgate regulations, substituting its earlier authority to merely issue guidelines. See
Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977). CEQ adopted interpretive regulations and other federal agencies must adopt their own NEPA regulations that comply with
the CEQ regulations. See MANDE KER, supra note 13, § 2.06[1]. Although Congress
deemed the CEQ's primary role to be advisory in nature, it has become the principal coordinating agency, policing federal agency compliance with NEPA and establishing some
degree of uniformity. Id.
19
Exec. Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
20
40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.12, 1508.17-.18, 1508-23 (1994). For example, with regard to
whether the EIS provisions apply to trade agreements, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (1) defines
"major Federal action" to include "treaties and international conventions or agreements."
In addition, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 defines "legislation" as "a bill or legislative proposal to
Congress developed by or with the significant cooperation and support of a Federal
agency.... The test for significant cooperation is whether the proposal is in fact predominantly that of the agency rather than another source."
21 MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 10.06.
22 See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (noting that CEQ regulations
deserve "substantial deference" by the courts). See also Izaak Walton League of Am. v.
Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
23
42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)-(E).

1995]

NOTE-IMPACT STATEMENTS

major actions and make this information available to the public.2 4
This informational function facilitates the discussion of environmen25
tal concerns before a specific decision about the proposal is made.
In fact, to ensure public participation, the CEQ regulations divide the
EIS process into two parts. First, the agency must prepare a draft environmental statement, which is circulated for comment.2 6 Second, the
agency must submit its final EIS to the EPA that, in turn, publishes the
statement in the Federal Register and allows for further public comment.2 7 After such discussion, however, the agency makes its own decision.2 8 Thus, based on the EIS, courts cannot stop an agency from
proceeding with its project.29 In general, then, "NEPA merely prohib-

its uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action." 30
The decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA led to increased
judicial review of federal agency decisions. 3 ' Soon after NEPA's enactment, courts ruled that NEPA imposes on agencies certain mandatory
24

See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (G).

25 The Supreme Court recently described the two purposes of NEPA's EIS requirement as follows:

It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and
will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be
made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the
decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). See also Izaak Walton League ofAm., 655 F.2d at 365 (noting that the EIS requirement for legislative proposals
"in part... ensure[s] that the public has an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
decisionmaking at the administrative and legislative levels").
26
27

40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1994).
Id. § 1506.10.

28
See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 ("[I]t is now well settled that NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.").
29 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (noting that once an agency has made a decision, having complied with NEPA's
procedural requirements, the court's role is limited to guaranteeing that the agency considered the environmental consequences, rather than judging the merits of the decision).
Courts can, however, review the agency's compliance with NEPA to determine
whether it has amounted to a full-faith consideration of the environmental consequences
of its actions. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (explaining that NEPA requires a "'systematic' balancing analysis" between options and that the court will scrutinize whether an
agency has in good faith complied with the statute). Furthermore, courts can review an
agency's compliance with NEPA under the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
not in accordance with law" standard. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). In general, courts do not substitute their decision for an
agency's. SeeVermontYankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
30 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
31 Prior to NEPA, federal agencies were usually shielded from aggressive judicial review of their actions. See MANDELKER,supra note 13, at ix (noting that prior to NEPA "federal agencies were usually protected from aggressive judicial review by deferential judicial
review standards enacted in the federal Administrative Procedure Act").

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:413

obligations that can be judicially enforced.3 2 Yet, because NEPA created no private right of action to enforce its provisions, litigants hoping to obtain judicial review of an agency's noncompliance with
NEPA's provisions must rely on the Administrative Procedure Act as a
33
vehicle to obtaining judicial review.
B.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

Section 702 of the APA enables persons "suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute" to obtain judicial recourse. 34 Courts have presumed a congressional intent in favor ofjudicial review under the APA where a statute does not expressly
indicate APA review. 35 Indeed, courts presumed an intent to permit
judicial review under the APA unless they were presented with "clear
and convincing evidence" to the contrary.36 Recently, however, courts
have become more reluctant to allow judicial review under section
702 and have moved away from the Act's liberal standing
37
requirements.
Three important factors limit the availability of judicial review
under the APA. First, the APA sections governing judicial review apply "except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review;
or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 38 Second, the APA applies only to actions by "federal agencies," 39 a term
32
33

Id.
The APA, however, is not an independent source of subject-matterjurisdiction. See

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977). Plaintiffs must also claim jurisdiction
under one of the federal jurisdictional statutes, which for NEPA plaintiffs is typically the
federal questions statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). MANDELKER, supra 13, § 4.03[1].
34
5 U.S.C. § 702.
35 The Supreme Court has endorsed the presumption of judicial review under the
APA for plaintiffs who fall within § 702. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140
(1967). See also Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 367 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (finding that NEPA's mandate that agencies comply with its
provisions "to the fullest extent possible" means that implied congressional repeals of
NEPA "should be found only in the rarest of circumstances"); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (finding that § 104 "relieve[d] an agency of its NEPA duties only if other 'specific
statutory obligations' clearly preclude[dJ performance of those duties"). Cf Stephen M.
Macfarlane, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Standing theAPA, and theFutureof
Environmental Litigation, 54 ALB. L. REv. 863, 876-77 (1990) (noting that although the
Supreme Court has recognized that the APA "embodies the basic presumption ofjudicial
review" for plaintiffs within § 702, its interpretation of the scope of that provision "has
varied over time").
36 See Roger Beers, Standing and Related ProceduralHurdles in Environmental Litigation,
C855 ALI-ABA 1, 28 (1993).
37
Id. at 27-31.
38 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). Section 701 qualifies judicial review available under §§ 702-706.
See WA TER GELLHORN Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAv 995 (8th ed. 1987).
39 The statute defines federal agencies to include
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the Supreme Court has held excludes review of Presidential actions. 40
Finally, the APA allows judicial review only of "final" agency action for
which there are no other adequate legal remedies. 41 Thus, agency
actions that are "preliminary, procedural or intermediate" are not
42
subject to judicial review.

C.

The Time Line for Preparing an EIS

NEPA does not expressly mandate the timing of an agency's preparation of an impact statement. 43 The Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the timing problem, to some extent, by specifying that the
agency's report or recommendation on a proposal triggers the EIS
requirement. 44 Courts then utilize one of the timing doctrines, such
as ripeness or finality, to guide their decisions on whether to hear a
case. Essentially, courts intervene only after an agency has completed
its report or recommendation on a proposal. At this time, courts hear
challenges to either the adequacy of the EIS or the agency's failure to
prepare an EIS.
1. Proposalfor Major FederalAction
In Aberdeen &?Rockfish Railroad Co. v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures45 (SCRAP fl), the Supreme Court first imposed
the proposal requirement as a trigger for NEPA application. After a
hearing, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued a report
regarding a proposed rate increase by railroads. The Court held that
the ICC should have prepared an impact statement after it had issued
its report and not at the time of the hearing. The Court stated that
"the time at which the agency must prepare the final 'statement' is the
each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency, but.., not .. . (A) the
Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the
territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the government of the
District of Columbia.
5 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (1).
40
The APA does not specifically exclude the President, although courts have read
this exemption into the statute. The D.C. Circuit held that the APA's definition of federal
"agency" excluded the President. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
Supreme Court confirmed this exclusion in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S.Ct. 2767,
2775-76 (1992). See also Carl Bretscher, The President andJudicialReview under the Records
Acts, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1477, 1508 (1992) (critiquing Armstrongv.Bush and the "barriers to judicial review created by executive privilege, separation of powers, and ambiguous
legislative intent").
41
5 U.S.C. § 704.
42
Id.
43 NEPA requires an impact statement on all "proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
44 See Aberdeen & Rockfish Ry. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975) (SCRAP R).
45
Id
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time at which it makes a recommendationor report on a proposalfor federal
46
action."
In attempting to define "proposal," the Supreme Court in Andrus
v. Sierra Club47 clarified that agency appropriation requests do not trigger the EIS requirement. In that case, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) required an environmental agency to decrease its appropriation request. Because the OMB did not prepare an EIS to accompany the requirement, plaintiffs challenged the OMB's decision.
The Court found, however, that requiring the OMB to prepare an EIS
would be premature because one could not predict how the agency
would respond to the budget cut and how its reaction, in turn, would
affect the environment. 4 8 It held that "OMB's determination to cut
the ...budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requir-

ing OMB to include an... [impact statement] in its budgetary cuts
would be premature." 49 The Court also relied on Congress' distinction between appropriations and legislation to hold that appropriation requests are not legislative proposals requiring an impact
statement. 50
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,5 1 the Supreme Court dealt with programmatic impact statements, whereby an agency prepares one EIS for an
entire program consisting of multiple segments. The Court reviewed
a challenge against the Department of the Interior for failure to prepare a regionalEIS on its proposal to develop coal reserves on federal
lands in the Northern Great Plains. The Department had prepared
an impact statement on national coal development and it conceded
that NEPA required site-specific impact statements. The Sierra Club
argued that, in addition to these site-specific impact statements, the
agency must provide a regional EIS to fully outline the foreseeable
effects of the coal development project. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Department had not made any proposal for action
at the regional level, but rather had only made proposals for actions at
the national or local level. 52 In attempting to define "pr6posal," the

Court repudiated the district court's finding that a "contemplated"
proposal satisfied the proposal requirement. 53 Thus, it held that a
54
regionwide EIS was not necessary.
46

Id. (emphasis added).

47
48

442 U.S. 347 (1979).
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.

49

50
51

427 U.S. 390 (1976).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 404.

Id. at 398 ("Respondents can prevail only if there has been a report or recommendation on a proposal for major federal action with respect to the Northern Great Plains
54
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In expanding on the timing of both the EIS process and its judicial review, the Keppe Court attacked the appellate court's balancing
approach. It found no basis for a balancing test in NEPA to determine the point at which an agency should begin an EIS when it formulates a plan for federal action. Instead, the Supreme Court
reiterated its finding in SCRAP I that "the moment at which an
agency must have a final statement ready 'is the time at which it makes
a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.' "55
The Court disputed the notion that agencies need not comply with
NEPA until the last minute and allayed concerns that the judiciary
might involve itself prematurely in the NEPA process. 56 Indeed, the
Court stressed that agencies should consider environmental factors
during the process of drafting a recommendation or report on a proposal.5 7 However, a court should not intervene until after the agency
completes its recommendation: only at this point can a court fully
assess the adequacy of the EIS or hear challenges to an agency's failure to comply with NEPA's mandates. 5 8
2.

Proposalsfor Legislation

NEPA's EIS requirement also extends to proposals for legislation.59 Defining "proposals for legislation" is a complicated task, frustrated by the paucity of decisions involving EISs on legislative
proposals. In addition, the intricate nature of the legislative process
makes identifying when an agency actually formulated a legislative
region.... [T]here has been none; instead, all proposals are for actions of either local or
national scope.").
55 Id. at 406 (quoting SCRAP 1, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975)).
56
In disputing the notion that agencies need not comply with NEPA until the last
minute and in allaying concerns that the judiciary may involve itself prematurely in the
NEPA process, the Court stated the following:
This is not to say that § 102(2) (c) imposes no duties upon an agency prior
to its making a report or recommendation on a proposal for action. This
section states that prior to preparing the impact statement the responsible
official "shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved." Thus, this section contemplates a consideration of environmental factors by agencies during the evolution of a report
or recommendation on a proposal. But the time at which a court enters the
process is when the report or recommendation on the proposal is made, and someone
protests either the absence or the adequacy of thefinal impact statement. This is the
point at which an agency's action has reached sufficient maturity to assure
that judicial intervention will not hazard unnecessary disruption.
Id. at 406 n.15 (emphasis added).
57
58
59

Id.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
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proposal difficult. 60 Numerous agencies, as well as other bodies, par-

ticipate in the legislative process, and a particular federal agency may
play only a limited role. 61 Courts thus face the question of whether an
agency's participation in the development of legislation is a "proposal
for legislation" requiring an impact statement. The CEQ regulations
define "legislation" as a "bill or legislative proposal to Congress developed by or with the significant cooperation and support for a Federal
agency."62 The test for "significant cooperation" is whether the proposal is "in fact predominantly that of the agency rather than another
63
source."
Although Keppe involved a proposal for major federal action,
courts have extended its rule to cases concerning proposals for legisla64
tion. For example, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander,
the district court held that the Corps of Engineers' report to Congress, recommending continuation of a NEPA-approved waterway and
preparation of a feasibility report, was not a proposal for legislation.
An EIS was unnecessary because the "language of the report, as to
future work, is tentative, preliminary, and of a general nature."6 5 The
report was merely a recommendation to investigate the feasibility of
the project and, at most, it described plans contemplated by the Corps
officials for additional work. The court based its ruling on Keppe's
66
holding that an EIS is unnecessary for merely contemplated plans.
In the past, most courts have enforced the requirement for impact statements on legislative proposals without waiting for the legislature to enact the proposal. For example, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway,67 the D.C. district court reviewed the Corps
of Engineers' proposed legislation and final impact statement on a
new lock and dam on the Mississippi River when plaintiffs challenged
particular inadequacies in the final impact statement. The court rejected the Corps' argument that the issue was not justiciable because
Congress had not yet enacted the proposed legislation. 68 The court
noted NEPA precedent establishing judicial review of the adequacy of
an EIS on proposals for major federal actions and stated that impact
60
See MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 8.05[7], at 8-64 (noting that "[d]etermining when
an agency has made a legislative proposal is difficult because congressional consideration
of proposed legislation is not a neat process").

61

Id.

62 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1994).
63 Id. See also State v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 255, 259 n.5 (D.N.D. 1980) (finding that
the test for "significant cooperation" is satisfied by federal agency "leg work" for a legislative proposal).
64 501 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
65
Id. at 750.
66
Id. at 750-51 (following Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)).
67
431 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1977).
68
Id. at 726-27.
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statements on legislative proposals were not distinguishable. 6 9 The
court noted that the result would be the same for a challenge to an
agency's failure to prepare an impact statement on a legislative
proposal.70
Thus, the operative language-that courts can review agency failure to comply with NEPA after the agency completes its recommendation or report on a proposal-also applies to legislative proposals.
Furthermore, precedent establishes that courts need not wait for Congress to enact the proposal in order to review the agency's independent statutory obligations during the proposal process.
3.

The Statutory Requirement of Finality and the Timing Doctrines
a. Finality in Non-NEPA Cases

In addition to focusing on the "proposal" requirement, a court
must also determine whether the action before it is ripe for review.
The ripeness doctrine serves the purpose of protecting agencies from
unnecessary or premature judicial review71 and is related to the APA
72
requirement of "final agency action."
The APA does not define "finality." In creating a finality doctrine, courts have followed a pragmatic approach introduced in the
73
Supreme Court's leading ripeness case, Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner.
While determining the ripeness issue, the Court addressed the issue of
finality. In reviewing a pre-enforcement challenge to a Food and
Id. at 726.
Id. at 728. Cf Wingfield v. Office of the Mgmt. and Budget, 9 Env't Rep. Cas. 1961
(D.D.C. 1977) (relying on separation of powers problems to hold that NEPA did not confer a private right of action to enforce the legislative EIS requirement). See also discussion
infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
71
SeeAbbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (describing the rationale of
the ripeness doctrine).
72
See MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 4.08[2), at 4-47. The APA finality requirement is
distinct, although related, to the timing doctrines, such as ripeness and exhaustion.
Although this Note addresses mainly the issue of finality, it is difficult to separate the categories because the courts often confuse these issues in their decisions. See, e.g. Ticor Title
Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (three separate opinions dismissing the
action based on exhaustion, finality, and ripeness). Cf. Beers, supra note 36, at 35 (noting
that "[a]lthough the requirement of 'finality' is at least akin to ripeness, it has recently
been dealt with as a separate concept," and citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767
(1992), as an example).
The finality determination precedes consideration of either ripeness or exhaustion,
because it is ajurisdictional requirement that a litigant must meet in order to state a claim
under the APA. See E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, PreservingReview of UndeclaredPrograms:
A Statutoy Redefinition of FinalAgengy Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 646 n.31 (1991). In addition, finality informs the ripeness inquiry since it is "an essential precondition to ripeness."
Id. The ripeness inquiry involves a two-step test: whether the issue is fit for review and
whether the denial of review would bring undue hardship to the litigant. The fitness of the
issue test focuses on whether the agency action is final. Id.
73 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
69
70
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Drug Administration regulation on drug labeling, the Court found
that the challenge was sufficiently final because the regulation had a
"direct effect on the day-to-day business" of the petitioning drug manufacturers. 74 Following this decision, courts have held that an agency
decision must be a "definitive" determination of the rights or obligations of the complaining party in order for it to be final under the
75
APA.
Franklin v. Massachusetts,76 the most recent non-NEPA Supreme
Court decision addressing the APA's finality requirement, expanded
the Abbott Laboratoriesanalysis. Residents of Massachusetts challenged
the Secretary of Commerce's method of calculating the 1990 decennial census, which deprived them of a seat in Congress. The Secretary
of Commerce altered the Massachusetts population count by deeming
922,819 overseas military personnel residents of the state of Washington because it was reported in their files as their "home of record."
77
This action eliminated one Representative from Massachusetts.
Plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary of Commerce's method of computing the census was arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Secretary
of Commerce's action satisfied the final agency action requirement of
the APA. 78 It first identified the point at which the challenged action
was final and then asked whether the final action was that of an
agency, as defined by the APA. It concluded that the final agency
action complained of was that of the President, and presidential ac79
tions are not reviewable under the APA.
The Franklin Court articulated the. following test for finality:
"[t] he core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will
directly affect the parties."8 0 In determining whether the plaintiffs satisfied this direct effects finality test, the Court focused on the PresiId. at 152.
75 See Garrity-Rokous, supra note 72, at 644. The leading case on final agency action is
a non-NEPA Supreme Court case, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S.
232 (1980). The Supreme Court relied on its finality analysis in Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S.
136 (1967), to hold that the FTC's issuance of a complaint was not final since it had no
significant "legal force or practical effect upon Socal's daily business." Id. at 243. The
Court articulated the test for finality as whether the agency's action was "definitive." Id.
74

The courts use the "definitive" test to guarantee that the agency has completed its decision-

making process, thereby avoiding unnecessary litigation over a tentative or informal ruling.
See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967).
76 112 S.Ct. 2767 (1992).
77

Id. at 2770.

78 Id. at 2773.
79 Id. The Supreme Court developed this test from its rule in Abbott Laboratories,387
U.S. at 152 (looking at whether the agency impact has a "direct effect on ...day-to-day
business").
80

112 S. Ct. at 2773.

1995]

NOTE-IMPACT STATEMENTS

dent's ability to modify the census report. Because the President
could change the report or instruct Congress to reform the census
before submitting the proposal to Congress, the Court characterized
the decennial report as "a moving target."8 l Therefore, the Secretary
of Commerce's census report to the President was similar to a tentative report or a report of a subordinate official.82 The Court concluded that "the action that creates an entitlement to a particular
number of Representatives and has a direct effect on the reapportionment is the President's statement to Congress, not the Secretary's re83
port to the President."
Under this reasoning, in order for the plaintiffs to satisfy the finality requirement, they would have to challenge the President's action of submitting the report to Congress, because this was the action
that directly affected them. The plaintiffs were precluded from challenging this action, however, because the APA allowsjudicial review of
agency but not presidential actions.8 4 Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that the issue was not justiciable under the
APA.85

b. Finality in NEPA Cases
The finality doctrine in NEPA cases is less clearly defined than in
non-NEPA cases. Courts rely on both the APA provision and the judicially created ripeness doctrine when determining the appropriate
time to hear a NEPA claim.8 6 In fact, justiciability depends on how
the particular court defines the challenged action before them.
Where the court defines the challenged action as an agency failure to
comply with NEPA, then judicial review may be granted and the finality requirement is satisfied. However, where the court focuses on the
underlying action, such as a mining project for which the agency has
failed to prepare an EIS, then judicial review is much more
problematic.
For example, in EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Inc. v. Johnson, 7 the
Corps of Engineers prepared a report on water needs in the northeastern states and recommended an "early action" water supply project that would draw water from the Hudson River. The Corps
81
Id. at 2774. The statute at issue did not require the President to transmit the Secretary of Commerce's report to Congress. Id.
82
The Supreme Court stated that agency action is not final if it is "the ruling of a
subordinate official" or "tentative." Id. at 2773 (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 151 (1967)).
83
Id.
84 Id. at 2776. See supra notes 39, 40.
85
112 S. Ct. at 2776.
86 See MANDELKER, supra note 13, §4.08[2], at 4-47.
87
629 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1980).
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prepared a draft impact statement on the Hudson River project but
did not intend to prepare a final statement until after completion of
the study. The court applied the APA finality doctrine and the ripeness doctrine to hold that the report was not a final agency action
requiring an EIS. Thus, in this case, the court focused on the actual
report in determining finality rather than focusing on the agency's
failure to comply with NEPA.
In another case, Foundationon Economic Trends v. Lyng, 8 the court
also focused on the underlying action in determining whether the finality requirement was satisfied. The D.C. Circuit held that environmental organizations did not have standing to challenge the
Department of Agriculture's failure to prepare an EIS on its germplasm preservation program.8 9 The court found that the agency's
program was not an "identifiable action or event" triggering the
agency's obligation to prepare an EIS. 90 Stating that the plaintiffs had
failed to identify any final agency action, the court held that "plaintiffs
seeking judicial review under section 702 of the APA for an alleged
violation of NEPA and claiming only an 'informational injury' must
show the particular agency action-in addition to the agency's refusal to
prepare an impact statement-that allegedly triggered the violation and
thereby caused the injury."9 1
The courts in Foundation on Economic Trends and Johnson focused
on whether the particular agency program or report satisfied the finality requirement. Other courts, however, focus on the finality of the
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS. Courts focusing on the
agency's decision are more likely to find the finality requirement satisfied. For example, in Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,9 2 the
court found the plaintiff's challenge to the EPA's failure to prepare an
EIS on the three-phased wastewater treatment project ripe for review.
Although the project was being re-evaluated, the court noted that the
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS was final. 93
Some courts have recognized the potential dangers of applying a
strict finality analysis in the NEPA realm. Judicial review may be unnecessarily delayed if courts hold that an agency action is not final
88
89

943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

d.

Id. at 85. The court based this conclusion on the Supreme Court's admonition in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), that courts should not review an
90

agency's day-to-day operations. 943 F.2d at 86.
91 943 F.2d at 87 (emphasis added).
92 503 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1980).
93 Noting that the action before it was not an APA action subject to limited review of
final agency decisions, the court stated that "NEPA is, by its own terms, addressed to agency
action which is non-final." Ida at 319.
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until the permit decision is made or until the project is completed. 94
As a result, some courts have recognized the need for prompt judicial
review and have held final an interim agency action if the agency is
committed to a course of action that may have adverse environmental
consequences. 95
The finality doctrine in NEPA cases needs clarification. Courts
will continue to reach differing results if they do not agree on the
appropriate action, either the agency decision not to prepare an EIS
or the underlying proposal, by which to judge finality.
D. Application of Franklin's Direct Effects Finality Test in
NEPA Cases
The application of the Franklinfinality test in NEPA cases has significant consequences for the private enforcement of NEPA's procedural requirements. According to Franklin, unless plaintiffs establish
that the agency actions directly affect them, they will not be able to
gain judicial review of their complaint under the APA. 9 6 Unfortunately, the inconsistent applications of Franklinin the lower courts, in
both NEPA and non-NEPA9 7 cases, leaves litigants without guidance.
94
See Foundation of Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Buckley, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's approach of "withholding judicial review until there is final agency approval of the proposed action would effectively eliminate
judicial oversight of NEPA's procedural requirements").
95 See MANDELKER, supra note 13, §4.08 [2], at 4-49. See, e.g., Colorado Envtl. Coalition
v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding final the recommendation of the
agency in the process of wilderness designation and requiring an EIS).
96 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2776 (1992).
97 The lower courts' inconsistent application of Franklinin non-NEPA cases resulted
in Supreme Court review of whether the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's act in recommending bases for closure to the President is a final decision reviewable
under the APA. In Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 2771 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
the Commission's action in recommending bases for closure was not final since the President had the ultimate decision on closure. This holding reversed the Third Circuit's ruling in Specter v. Garrett, 995 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court's ruling in
Specter, however, proved inconclusive with respect to Franklin's application in the NEPA
realm, such as in the Public Citizen case. The Specter holding merely states that courts may
not review the President's discretion in accepting or rejecting a recommended base-closing
list, and an aggrieved party may not enjoin closure of a base due to an alleged error in the
President's decisionmaking process. 114 S. Ct. at 2278. Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in Specter noted that the majority's decision would not foreclose judicial review of
presidential action if there had been aclam that the President had not complied with his
statutory duty. Id. (BlackmunJ., concurring). In addition, the majority decision in Specter
would not foreclose judicial review of a procedural violation, such as a decision to close the
Commission's hearing to the public, because such a decision affects the "rights of interested parties independent of any ultimate presidential review." Id. at 1279. This latter
situation is analogous to an agency's failure to comply with NEPA's procedural mandates,
which also affects the rights of interested parties regardless of the President's ultimate
decision on the merits. To the extent that the Supreme Court in Specter did not address
this situation, the majority decision fails to clarify the ambiguity resulting from Franklin's
application in the NEPA realm.
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This Note builds three competing models, each of which stems from
an opinion in Public Citizen. These models detail a unique analytical
approach for the method by which courts define the agency action
and determine finality for purposes of providing APA review in NEPA
cases after Franklin.
1. Model 1: Distinguish Franklin
According to Model 1, the court defines the agency action for
purposes of APA review as the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS
statement. Furthermore, the agency's action is final after it issues its
report or recommendation. Litigants can seek judicial review at this
time and need not wait for the recommendation to take effect. Judge
Richey's district court opinion in Public Citizen v. Office of the United
States Trade RepresentativeR8 exemplifies the first model. In 1991, Public
Citizen, Friends of the Earth, and Sierra Club voiced their concerns
that the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was
not taking environmental consequences into consideration during negotiations of NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The three public interest organizations filed suit
against the USTR to enforce NEPA compliance after the USTR indicated its intent not to prepare an EIS on the proposal for NAFTA. 9 9
The district court dismissed the case on the ground that the dispute
was not ripe because the agreements had not yet been concluded. 10 0
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 1 1
Upon conclusion of the NAFTA negotiations, Public Citizen filed
another suit to compel the USTR to produce an EIS on the final draft
of the NAFTA agreement. District CourtJudge Richey found in favor
of the public interest organizations and ordered the USTR to prepare
an EIS "with all deliberate speed." 0 2 He concluded that "the plain
language of the NEPA makes it a foregone conclusion that the
[USTR] must prepare an EIS on the NAFTA." 1 3 In addressing the
USTR's claims that the court lacked jurisdiction, Judge Richey examined the APA's requirement of final agency action. He noted that
98 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), reud, 5 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994).
99 Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C.)
(Public Citizen 1), af'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
100 Id at 142-43.
101
970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Note, however, that the court of appeals dismissed
the case due to a lack of any identifiable final agency action at that point in the NAFTA
negotiations. The court never gave any reason to believe that this finality requirement
would not be met in the future or that the court could never review the USTR's failure to
comply with NEPA when it prepared a legislative proposal regarding a trade agreement.
See Public Citizen Cert. Petition, supra note 8, at 8.
102 822 F. Supp. at 30.
103 Id.at 29.
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unlike the previous case brought in 1991, the NATA agreement had
10 4
since been finalized.
In response to the USTR's claim that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the President negotiated NAFTA, Judge Richey found that
NAFTA was "in substantial part, a result of the work of the Defendant
[USTR]" and described the USTR's role in conducting international
trade negotiations. 10 5 Judge Richey also rejected the USTR's principal point that because the President submits the NAFTA proposal to
Congress, review of the failure to prepare an EIS is barred by the
APA. 10 6 In making this argument, the USTR relied principally on
Franklin v. Massachusetts.10 7 Judge Richey, however, distinguished
Franklinfrom the NATA case:
[T]he NAFTA is in stark contrast to the census report in Franklin
because the NAFTA is a complete and, most importantly, a final product

that will not be changed before submission to Congress. The NAFTA that
was negotiated and signed by the Trade Representative is the same document
08
that shall be submitted to Congress and which is the subject of this suit.

Judge Richey concluded that the President's authority not to submit NAFTA to Congress does not bar APAjurisdiction. 0 9 In support
of this contention, Judge Richey indicated that the clear statutory language of NEPA requires an EIS on all legislative proposals that significantly affect the environment." 0 Furthermore, Judge Richey found
that the agency should prepare an EIS when it has completed its legislative proposal."' He cited Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel" 2 for the proposition that the submission of the legislative proposal is not a
prerequisite to the preparation of an EIS; to hold otherwise would
likely result in the aggrieved party losing its right to judicial review,
because after Congress acts on a proposal the issue is moot." 3 Finally,
Judge Richey held both that judicial review pursuant to the APA in
this case was not a violation of the separation of powers and that the
plaintiffs had standing because they had made the requisite allegation
114
of injury as a consequence of NAFTA.
104 Id. at 24. The United States, Canada, and Mexico had signed the agreement and,
in light of the fast track procedure, the agreement could not be modified after it had been
sent to Congress. See supra note 8.
105
106
107

108

Id. at 25.

Id. at 25-26.
112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
822 F. Supp. at 26.

109
110

I&

"II

Id

Id

806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
822 F. Supp. at 26.
114
Id. Seeseparation of powers discussion, id.at 26-27; standing discussion, id. at 27-29.
Since the appellate court did not reach the standing and separation of powers issues be112

113
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A recent Colorado district court decision, ColoradoEnvironmental
Coalitionv. Lujan," 5 also applied this analytical model. In Lujan, environmental groups challenged the Secretary of the Interior's decision
to remove five wilderness study areas from wilderness recommendation without preparing a supplemental EIS (or SEIS)." 6 The Secretary, relying on Franklin,argued that no final agency action exists until
the President transmits his recommendation for wilderness designation to Congress. The Court disagreed, holding that the "Secretary's
decision not to prepare a SEIS pursuant to NEPA is final agency acn7
tion subject to review under the APA."
Under Model 1, Franklinposes little concern for the review of an
agency's failure to prepare an EIS on a legislative proposal. Courts
can distinguish Franklin by defining the challenged action as the
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS rather than focusing on the
underlying action.
2.

Model 2: Franklin Limits Reviewability of ETSs on
Legislative Proposals

According to Model 2, a court defines the agency action for purposes of APA review as the underlying action, or the specific action to
which the proposal speaks. Furthermore, the agency's action is final
only after the agency's recommendation on the proposal takes effect
or the President submits it to Congress. Until then, litigants challenging an agency's failure to prepare an EIS on a legislative proposal will
not gain judicial review under the APA. The D.C. Circuit court's analysis in Public Citizenn 8 epitomizes the second analytical model. Relying on Franklin, the D.C. Circuit adopted the government's position
that "NAFTA does not constitute 'final agency action' within the
cause it concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction, and because this Note focuses on the
finality issue, Judge Richey's disposal of these issues in favor of plaintiffs is not discussed in
detail. However, see infra part II.C for a discussion of why the separation of powers concerns do not necessitate a total elimination of judicial review. Furthermore, see infra part
II.D for a discussion of how the importation of Franklin in the NEPA realm upsets the
balance of power in favor of the Executive.
115
803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
116
After an agency has prepared an EIS, it must prepare a supplemental EIS if the
agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that affect the environment. 40
C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1) (1994).
117
803 F. Supp. at 370. The court also rejected a separation of powers argument finding that a supplemental EIS prepared by the Secretary of the Interior would not interfere
with the executive and legislative branches of government. See id ("Just as Congress does
not violate separation of powers by structuring the procedural manner in which the executive branch shall carry out the laws, surely the federal courts do not violate separation of
powers when, at the very instruction and command of Congress, they enforce these
procedures.").
118 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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meaning of the APA." n 9 Refusing to address the merits of the case,
and leaving the fate of NAFTA in the "hands of the political
120
branches," the court stated that the "judiciary has no role to play."
In deciding whether the challenged action is reviewable under
the APA, the D.C. Circuit adopted the Franklin Court's finality test.
The D.C. Circuit claimed that regardless of USTR's role in negotiating
and finalizing NAFTA, the agreement would have no effect on Public
Citizen's members "unless and until the President submits it to Congress."'12 The court indicated that the proposal must be submitted to
Congress prior to judicial review because "an agency's failure to prepare an EIS, by itself, is not sufficient to trigger APA review in the
absence of identifiable substantive agency action putting the parties at
risk."122 The court further noted that NAFTA is similar to the census
report in Franklinin that it, too, is a "moving target" because the President does not have to submit the proposal directly to Congress with23
out further modification.'
Finally, the court answered the plaintiffs' allegation that the strict
application of the Franklin direct effects finality test would result in
the "death knell" of the EIS on legislative proposals. 124 The majority
decision limited the application of the direct effects test to "those
cases in which the President has final constitutional or statutory responsibility for the final step necessary for the agency action directly
to affect the parties." 125 In essence, the court distinguished situations
in which the agency submits the legislation to Congress from those in
which the President submits the legislation. The former would be
subject to judicial review; the latter would not.
In sum, Model 2, as illustrated by Franklin,limits the reviewability
of EISs on legislative proposals by defining the challenged action as
the underlying action and holding that review is not available until
Congress acts on the proposal or the President submits it to Congress.

119 Id at 551.
120 Id. at 553.
121 Id at 551. This statement, although logical on its face, inherently conflicts with the
purpose of NEPA's EIS requirement and with cases that mandate the issuance of an EIS

before the proposal is submitted to Congress, allowing aggrieved parties to seek judicial
review before the issue is moot. See discussion infra part IIA.2.
122 5 F.3d at 552 (citing Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125

Id.
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Model 3: Franklin ForeclosesJudicialReview of an Agency's
Failure to Preparean FIS on a Legislative Proposal

Similar to Model 2 courts, a court adhering to a Model 3 approach defines the agency action for purposes of APA review as the
underlying action of the proposal. However, according to this model,
litigants seeking review of an agency's failure to prepare an EIS on a
legislative proposal will never meet the APA finality requirement.
Judge Randolph's concurring opinion in Public Citizen characterizes
this model. 12 6 Judge Randolph stated that "if one takes Franklin at its
word, a legislative proposal's lack of any direct effects would seem to
mean that there can be no final action sufficient to permit judicial
review under the APA." 127 He emphasized that Franklinheld not only
that the President is outside the APA's definition of agency, but also
that the "action" cannot be considered "final" under the APA unless it
will "directly affect the parties." 28 He then stated that "it is difficult to
see how the act of proposing legislation could generate direct effects
129
on parties, or anyone else for that matter."
Interestingly, Judge Randolph, although admitting that this is a
"troublesome question," 3 0° refused to say whether the act of proposing legislation constitutes final agency action under the APA. He also
admitted that there is an inherent conflict in applying Franklin's finality test to NEPA cases: 'Judicial review under the APA demands 'final
agency action' whereas the duty to prepare an impact statement arises
earlier."' 31 Recognizing this conflict, Judge Randolph noted that
Franklin's direct effects test as applied in NEPA cases will have to be
reconciled with Kleppe, which states that the time for judicial review is
i3 2
when someone challenges an agency's failure to prepare an EIS.
Yet, he failed to reconcile the two cases. Although he recognized the
dilemma arising within NEPA cases, he was troubled by the majority's
inclination to put limits on the Franklintest and offered only an unattractive alternative-that the "legislative proposal" would never meet
33
the direct effects test.'

126
127

128
129
130

Id.
Id.
Id.
idId.

at 553 (Randolph, J., concurring).
at 554.
at 553 (quoting Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773).
at 554.

132

Id.
427 U.S. 390 (1976).

133

5 F.3d at 554.
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II
ANALYSIS

In this Part, this Note argues that courts should not apply the
APA finality requirement in the manner articulated in Franklin to
NEPA cases. Part H.A argues that the purpose and legislative history
of NEPA, the CEQ regulations and the legislative history of the APA
strongly weigh in favor of a presumption of review. Part II.B demonstrates that the APA's "final agency action" requirement does not pose
an obstacle to the courts' review of an agency's independent statutory
obligations. Part II.C discusses the separation of powers issues and
argues that they do not require the elimination of all judicial review.
Finally, Part II.D'proposes the appropriate model by which courts
should define the challenged action as the agency failure to abide by
NEPA. Additionally, courts should define the agency action as "final"
for purposes of APA review after it has completed its recommendation
or report on a proposal for legislation. This model best serves the
courts' interest of maintaining the appropriate balance of power
among the branches.
A.

Strong Presumption of Judicial Review
1. NEPA's Legislative History

In determining whether a statute specifically precludes judicial
review, courts examine the language, legislative history, and objectives
of the statute.18 4 Unfortunately, the language of NEPA does not speak
to judicial review of agency compliance with its terms.1 3 5 Similarly,
the legislative history of NEPA provides little guidance. Congress gave
little thought to the impact statement requirement, which was added
after the introduction of the bill in Congress. 136 Because the EIS requirement was an afterthought, there is no legislative history regarding the role of the courts as NEPA enforcers.' 37 Despite congressional
neglect in addressing the role of the judiciary in enforcing NEPA, the
large body of NEPA case law demonstrates the significant role that
courts have assumed in policing agency compliance with NEPA's
138
mandates.
134 Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984).
135 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 470 F.2d
289, 299 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that NEPA is silent on the issue ofjudicial review).
136 See MANELxER, supra note 13, § 2.02, at 2-3.
137 However, in Atchison, Topeka & S.F.Ry. v. Calaway, the court outlined NEPA precedent establishing judicial review of EISs on proposals for major federal action and stated
that there were no reasons to distinguish impact statements on legislative proposals. 431 F.
Supp. 722, 725-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
138 Federal courts have held that judicial review of agency decisions under NEPA is
implied. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

434

2.

[Vol. 80:413

NEPA's Purpose

NEPA's objectives strongly support the proposition that Congress
did not intend to preclude judicial review of agency compliance with
its statutory mandates. Congress intended federal agencies to consider environmental factors during their decisionmaking process. 13 9
The specificity of the actual process by which agencies should factor in
environmental considerations speaks to the importance of ensuring
agency compliance with the procedure. Without judicial review or
some other enforcement mechanism, there is little hope that agencies
would comply with what one commentator heralded as the "environ1
mental bill of rights."

40

Prior to NEPA, the majority of federal legislation was "missionoriented" and left environmental considerations "systematically under
represented." 14 1 Congress intended the Act to "provide all agencies
...with a legislative mandate and a responsibility to consider the consequences of their actions on the environment."1 4 2 Congress devised
NEPA in order to guarantee that activities that would have a significant effect on the environment would "proceed only after an ecologi1 43
cal analysis and projection of probable effects."
Thus, Congress had a two-fold purpose in drafting the EIS requirement to guarantee that agencies consider the environmental
consequences of their actions and to require them to disseminate the
knowledge of these consequences to the public.' 44 Thus, the function
of the EIS has been described as:
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("NEPA... creates judicially enforceable

duties").
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331(a).
140 Evan H. Hanks &John L. Hanks, An EnvironmentalBill ofRights: The Citizen Suit and
the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act of 1969, 24 Ru-rc. L. Rnv. 230, 230 (1970).
141
See MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 1.02, at 1-3 (quoting A. Dan Tarlock, Balancing

Environmental ConsiderationsandEnergy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 658 (1972)).
142
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on InteriorandInsular Affairs on § 1075, § 237 and § 1752, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings]. Congress specifically prescribed national environmental goals so that "[n]o agency
will then be able to maintain that it has no mandate or no requirement to consider the
environmental consequences of its actions." See id. at 206.
143 See MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 1.02, at 1-4 (quoting the Congressional White Paper on a National Policy for the Environment, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (Comm. Print 1968),
which was the seed for NEPA's EIS provision).
144 The Supreme Court described the two purposes of NEPA's EIS requirement as
follows:
It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and
will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be
made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the
decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). See also Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
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permit[ting] the court to ascertain whether the agency has made a
good faith effort to take into account the values NEPA seeks to safeguard.... [I] t serves as an environmental full disclosure law, providing information which Congress thought the public should have
concerning the particular environmental costs involved in. a
145
project.

Furthermore, Congress' objective in light of the EIS is to guarantee
that the agencies consider the environment before they make a final
decision.' 4 6 The CEQ regulations further this purpose by specifying
that the agency must start working on the EIS as soon as it begins
working on a proposal.' 4 7 In general, the CEQ regulations state that
"[algencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other planning at
the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect
environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head
off potential conflicts." 148 Moreover, the CEQ regulations note that
"[t]he statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve
practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already
made."149
The timing of the EIS in the decisionmaking process is crucial.
Decisionmakers must consider the environmental effects of their options early to allow them to choose wisely among options and benefit
from the environmental assessment. Furthermore, the EIS affords the
general public an opportunity to remain informed of the agency's actions and to involve itself in the decisionmaking process. 50 In order
to accomplish this purpose, however, the public needs the teeth of
judicial review to enforce an agency's failure to prepare an EIS when
(1981) (noting that the EIS requirement on legislative proposals "in part... ensure[s] that
the public has an opportunity to participate meaningfully in decisionmaking at the administrative and legislative levels").
145
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1294 (1st Cir. 1973).
146
Even Judge Randolph noted in Public Citizen that the "main objective of an impact
statement is to ensure that the decisionmaker considers environmental effects prior to
taking action." 5 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
147
The Supreme Court stated in Andrus v. Sierra Club that "CEQ's interpretation of
NEPA is entitled to substantial deference." 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). See Note, NEPA After
Andrus v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of SubstantialDeference to the Regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. REv. 843 (1980). Courts often adopt CEQ's language in
NEPA cases. For example, in Scientists'Inst.for Pub. Infor., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, the
court noted that "the basic thrust of NEPA is to require consideration of environmental

effects of proposed agency action long enough before that action is taken so that important agency decisions can meaningfully ieflect environmental concerns." 481 F.2d 1079,
1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
148 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (1994).
149 Id. § 1502.5.
150 Izaak Walton League ofAm. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981) ("NEPA establishes the environmental impact statement requirement for
proposals for legislation in part to ensure that the public has an opportunity to participate
meaningfully in decisionmaking at the administrative and legislative levels.").
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appropriate. Earlyjudicial enforcement of the statute best realizes the
intent of the law.15 1 By flagging an agency's failure to comply with
NEPA at an early stage, the courts can encourage the agency to consider the environmental consequences of its actions and to keep the
public informed.
3.

Legislative History of the APA

In light of the absence of an express preclusion ofjudicial review
in NEPA, there is a strong presumption of judicial review under the
APA.' 52 In recommending the enactment of the APA, the 1945
House and Senate Judiciary Committees stated that a statute will very
rarely withhold judicial review and to do so the statute "must upon its
face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it."15
Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted the Committee's remarks in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.5 4 The Court stated that "only upon a
showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." 155
The House Judiciary Committee emphasized that Congress' failure to write judicial review into a particular statute does not translate
into congressional intent to withhold review. 156 In fact, when Congress has wanted to preclude judicial review of NEPA claims, it has
done so through specific statutory exemptions. For example, the Defense Authorization Amendments Base Closure and Realignment Act
of 1990157 expressly exempts specific actions of the Secretary and the
Commission from NEPA. 15 8
This clear statutory exemption fits the APA framework: there is a
strong presumption ofjudicial review unless a statute precludes review
or commits the action to agency discretion by law. 159 Congress intended that the first exception, statutory preclusion, rarely would be
found. 160 Congress did not intend its statutes to be "merely advi151 Although the intent of law is best carried out by a consideration of the environmental impact at the beginning of the project, the agency should also gauge the environmental

consequences at each stage as planning of the project progresses. See 2 FRANK P. GRAD,
TRFATSE ON ENVRONmENTAL LAW §9.02, at 9-102 (1992).
152 See discussion supra part IIA.1.
153
Hearings, supra note 142, at 275.
154 387 U.S. 186 (1967).
155 Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 867, 379-80 (1962)).

See Hearings,supra note 142, at 275.
157 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1988).
158 See also Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96
Stat. 1847-48 (1982) (NEPA exemption regarding MX missile basing system).
159 5 U.S.C. § 701.
160 See Hearings,supra note 142, at 275 ("It has never been the policy of Congress to
prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope
of authority granted or to the objectives specified.").
156
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sory." 161 Without judicial review, statutes would "be blank checks
drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board."162 Similarly, the courts narrowly read the APA's limitation on judicial review
of matters committed to agency discretion, finding it inapplicable to
63
questions of law.'
The strong presumption of judicial review under the APA codified the liberal principles ofjudicial review prior to the APA. As early
as Marbury v. Madison,'64 the Supreme Court established that an aggrieved party could seek remedy through a writ of mandamus to compel compliance with statutory mandates. Chief Justice Marshall
emphasized that one of the first duties of government is to afford
65
every individual the protection of the laws whenever she is injured.
Prior to the APA, courts often reviewed claims of agencies exceeding
their statutory authority. 6 6 Thus, without a clear indication from
Congress, and in light of the NEPA statutory scheme and objectives,
there is little reason to believe that an implied preclusion ofjudicial
67
review of an agency's independent statutory obligations exists.'
Many commentators have applauded this presumption of review.
For example, Professorjaffe notes that 'judicial review is the rule....
It is a basic right; it is a traditional power and the intention to exclude
it must be made specifically manifest."168 The overall presumption of
judicial review under the APA was intended to bolster a court's aggressive review of an agency's actions. This kind of aggressive review maintains people's faith in administrative agencies.' 69 In addition, the
161
162
163

Id.
Id.

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (holding that the committed to
agency discretion exception is narrow and "applicable in those rare instances where 'stat-

utes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply'" (quoting
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971))). The legislative history of the APA
supports the Chaney holding. See S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945) (If

"statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts
of course have no statutory question to review" but "where statutory standards, definitions,
or other grants of power deny or require action in given situations or confine an agency
within limits as required by the Constitution, then the determination of the facts does not
lie in agency discretion but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial

record.").
164
165
166

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-65 (1803).
Id. at 163.
See, e.g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) (holding producers of milk had

standing to sue the Secretary of Agriculture to enjoin Secretary from carrying out regulations he had promulgated); American Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94,
110 (1902) (reviewing postmaster general's detention of mail without statutory authority).
167
See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (refusing to find an implied
preclusion of judicial review since the Secretary of Labor failed to show with "clear and
convincing evidence" that Congress intended to prohibit all judicial review).
168
Louis L.Jaffe, The Right to JudirialReuiew , 71 HAv. L. REv. 401, 432 (1958).
169
See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATVE ACTION 320 (1965) ("The
availability ofjudicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a

438

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:413

strong presumption stands as a guarantee that statutory mandates will
170
not go unnoticed.
B.

The APA's Final Agency Action Requirement Is Not an
Obstacle to Gaining Judicial Review of an Agency's
Independent Statutory Obligations

Section 704 of the APA requires "final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in court" as a prerequisite to gainingjudicial review. 17 1 The legislative history of the APA explains the
meaning of this language and the purposes of the Act's finality requirement. 17 2 Additionally, it supports the proposition that the APA's
final agency action requirement permits judicial review of an agency's
compliance with its independent statutory obligations, regardless of
whether the President plays a role in the final decisionmaking
process.
One rationale for the finality doctrine is "to protect the agencies
from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." 7 3 The Court in Franklinmimicked this language when it articulated the "core question" as "whether the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one
that will directly affect the parties." 74
However, Franklin's finality test is stricter than that intended by
Congress when it designed the APA. Indeed, Congress viewed the
APA's finality restriction to be a "mild" one, primarily designed to preclude judicial review of preliminary agency decisions. 175 The Senate
Judiciary Committee Notes on the APA describe how the finality requirement was "designed... to negate any intention to make reviewable merely preliminary or procedural orders." 176 In addition, section
704 states that preliminary or intermediate agency actions and rulings
77
are subject to judicial review upon review of the final agency action.'
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legallyvalid."). Seegenerally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action,
1989 DuKE L.J. 522, 525 (discussing arguments supporting aggressive judicial review of
agency action).
170 For example, Professor Schwartz notes that "[t]he responsibility of enforcing the
limits of statutory grants of authority is a judicial function.... Without judicial review,
statutory limits would be naught but empty words." BEmRARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATV

§ 8.1 (2d ed. 1984).
171 5 U.S.C. § 704.
172 See Garrity-Rokous, supra note 72, at 646-49 (discussing the legislative history of the
APA).
173 Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
174 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992).
175 See Garrity-Rokous, supra note 72, at 647.
176 See Hearings,supra note 142, at 27.
177 5 U.S.C. § 704.
LAW
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Thus, Congress intended the final agency action requirement
merely to delay judicial review until the agency had taken its final action on the matter at issue. Thus, Public Citizen's application of Franklin to preclude review of an agency's independent statutory mandates,
merely because the President also acts upon the final project, introduces a limitation on a court's jurisdiction not found within the
APA. 1 78

Unless courts can enforce agency compliance with NEPA at the
point when an agency has completed its decisionmaking process and
failed to prepare an EIS, the purposes and congressional intent of
NEPA will not be served.' 7 9 To hold that the parties are not directly
affected until the proposed project is underway or until the proposed
legislation is passed is to flagrantly disregard Congress' intent in requiring all federal agencies to comply with NEPA. Courts have reviewed allegations of possible NEPA violations even where other
actions must be taken before the underlying action will directly injure
the plaintiffs.' 8 0 For example, courts have reviewed challenges to an
agency's compliance with NEPA's EIS requirement on legislative proposals after the agency has made its recommendation on the legislative proposal, even though Congress could either change the proposal
or refuse to enact it.181 If courts are forced to wait until the legislation
is enacted or the project completed before they can gain review under
the APA, the issue will be moot, since the agency should have assessed
the environmental considerations during the process of deciding on a
specific course of action, or a specific legislative proposal. More importantly, once the proposal has been adopted, an EIS cannot serve its
See discussion infra part II.D.3.
See discussion supra parts II.A.1, II.2.
180 For example, courts have on numerous occasions reviewed an agency's EIS on a
proposal for a mining or development permit prior to the commencement of the building
project, which allegedly may injure the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (reviewing a challenge to the Forest Service's compliance with NEPA's mitigation and "worse case analysis" EIS requirements prior to issuing
a permit for development and operation of a ski resort on national forest land). See also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142 n.7 (1992) (noting, in dicta, that a
person living adjacent to a proposed dam site may challenge an agency's failure to prepare
an EIS prior to issuing a license "even though he cannot establish with any certainty that
the Statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam
will not be completed for many years").
181
See, e.g., Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reviewing a
challenge to NEPA's EIS requirement even though Congress had not yet approved the
project; holding that the draft EIS was required when proposal submitted to Congress for
approval); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(reviewing the adequacy of a legislative EIS prior to Congressional determination of the
future management of an Alaskan wildlife refuge). See also Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel,
806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986) (judicial review of agency's announced procedure for issuing
an EIS on a legislative proposal before the agency even issued its legislative proposal).
178

179

CORNELL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 80:413

primary function of informing the debate as to whether the proposal
18 2
should have been adopted in the first place.
Congress enacted section 704 of the APA in order to avoid premature judicial intervention in the agency decisionmaking process.
Congress did not, however, intend to preclude review entirely. Once
the agency has taken its final steps in the process, then the issue is
"final" for purposes of APA review. Congress has given no reason to
believe that this basic rationale, supported in the many finality
cases, 18 3 should be altered in a situation where the agency's final steps
are followed by some presidential action.
C.

Separation of Powers Problems Arising From Judicial Review
of Matters Involving Presidential Discretion

Suits questioning an administrative agency's compliance with specific statutory mandates do raise legitimate separation of powers concerns. These concerns do not, however, necessitate the total
abrogation ofjudicial review in the face of executive discretion in the
legislative process. 84 In Public Citizen, the majority stated that the application of Franklin to NEPA cases is limited to those situations "in
which the President has final constitutional or statutory responsibility
for the final step necessary for the agency action directly to affect the
parties." 185 Arguably, the court did not want to hear the case because
of the President's political role in the legislative process.18 6 Furthermore, some may argue that courts have no authority to review a presidential proposal to Congress, especially when such a review includes
critiquing the merits of the proposal or the President's adherence to a
87
statute such as NEPA.1
182 See 806 F.2d at 1381 (noting that the Department's decision to refuse public comment is "clear and final," the court explained that "[o]nce Congress acts on the information submitted to it, the Trustees will lose their right to comment on the draft LEIS at the
administrative level").
183 See discussion suprapart I.C.3.
184 In fact, Public Citizen ultimately leaves administrative agency action unchecked by

the judiciary, thereby upsetting the balance of power between the three branches of government. See discussion infra part II.D.3.
185 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
186 See id. at 553 (leaving the fate of NAFTA in the "hands of the political branches"
and noting that the "judiciary has no role to play").
187 See MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 4.06[3] U], at 4-39, 440 n.100 ("Additional
problems may arise in legislative impact statement cases because the political nature of the
legislative process raises separation of powers and redressability problems.... Some courts
have held that the environmental impact statement for proposals on legislation isjudicially
unenforceable."). See alsoWingfield v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 9 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1961, 1963 (D.D.C. 1977) (noting in dicta that "the issue.., places the Court in conflict
with coordinate branches of the Government, since even Plaintiff recognizes that the President, himself, whatever the strictures of [NEPA] could present whatever proposals and
recommendations he chose to the Congress without reference to NEPA").
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Certainly, separation of powers problems would arise if a court
were to review the merits of a presidential decision. Although the
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison held that the courts can review
all questions arising out of the Constitution, the Court also noted that
there would be some constitutional issues committed to political discretion. 188 Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire
how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
89
have a discretion."
Although courts have generally viewed presidential actions as discretionary, and thus, unreviewable, they have not relinquished the
power to determine whether the President has exceeded his constitutional grant of authority. 90 For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure Case), the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution did not authorize President Truman to order the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession and operate the nation's
steel mills in the name of national security. 19' The courts will also
review whether the President has exceeded any congressional grant of
authority. Thus, in Youngstown, the Supreme Court further held that
Congress had not authorized the President to order the Secretary of
Commerce to seize the mills. By taking this unauthorized action, Pres19 2
ident Truman had usurped legislative prerogative.
In addition to reviewing the constitutionality of Presidential actions, the presence of a discretionary matter in a case will not prevent
193
judicial review of an agency's independent statutory obligations.
Public Citizen exemplifies this scenario since the plaintiffs challenged
the USTR's failure to comply with NEPA's EIS requirement. The
plaintiffs did not challenge the President's compliance with NEPA,
nor did the plaintiffs challenge the merits of the President's NAFTA
See LAWRENC E H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTTONAL LAw 72 and n.6 (1978).
189 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
190 TRIBE, supra note 188, at 73 (Marbury's holding "does not deprive the Court of all
power to interpret a constitutional provision: it retains the power to determine whether a
particular congressional or executive action comes within the terms of the constitutional
grant of authority.").
191 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
192 TRIBE, supra note 188, at 181. See also Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex.
rel Payne, 250 U.S. 163 (1919) (holding that the Court did not have the power to review
whether the President abused his discretion in possessing the telephone lines following a
congressional delegation to do so, but it could review whether the President exceeded the
congressional authority granted him).
193 See also David T. Gibbons, Note, Nafta vs. The Environment: The Court's Mandate to
Require the Preparationof EnvironmentalImpact Statementsfor Trade Agreements, 15 HiAmuNJ.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 101, 119-20 (1994) (arguing that "[t]he effect of denying NEPA claims
under APAjurisdiction, because only the President can submit legislative proposals is tantamount to a violation of Marbury v. Madison and the well established doctrine ofjudicial
review").
188
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proposal. Thus, the plaintiffs did not seek to set aside the proposal
implementing NAFTA,19 4 but sought merely to obtain an order re195
quiring the USTR to complete an EIS.
A vast body of NEPA precedent demonstrates the courts' power
to review an agency's compliance with NEPA even if the underlying
action concerns foreign affairs, such as military matters or matters pertaining to an international agreement. In these scenarios, the President may have the final authority over the matter, given his Article II
powers, but the courts can review NEPA compliance by the agencies
assisting the President in his final decision. For example, in Sierra
Club v. Adams, the court reviewed plaintiffs' challenge of the adequacy
of the EIS pertaining to the construction of the Darien Gap Highway
in Panama and Columbia.19 6 Furthermore, in National Organizationfor
Reform of MarijuanaLaws v. United States Department of State, the court
found that an agency had violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS
regarding the United States' participation in herbicide spraying of
marijuana and poppy plants in Mexico.' 97 In these cases, the President as commander-in-chief possessed the ultimate constitutional authority over the matter. Nevertheless, the court did not hesitate to
review challenges to the agency compliance with NEPA prior to presidential involvement.
In conclusion, potential separation of powers issues do not completely foreclose judicial review of agency compliance with independent statutory obligations. In situations where the President holds the
ultimate authority to institute a proposal, the courts are not authorized to review the merits of his decision. However, the President's
holding of this ultimate power does not shield agencies from judicial
review of their independent statutory obligations. Franklin,thus, does
not dispense with the need for courts to clearly define the challenged
action and to define what constitutes "final agency action" for purposes of affording review under the APA.

194
Certainly, there would be separation of powers problems if the judiciary were to
enjoin the submission or consideration of legislation. The courts cannot enjoin Congress'
power to consider legislation because the Constitution grants "[a]ll legislative Powers" to
Congress. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1.
195 The court in Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan refuted a separation of powers
argument finding that a supplemental EIS prepared by the Secretary of Interior would not
interfere with the executive and legislative branches of government. See 803 F. Supp. 364,
370 (D. Colo. 1992) ("Just as Congress does not violate separation of powers by structuring
the procedural manner in which the executive branch shall carry out the laws, surely the
federal courts do not violate separation of powers when, at the very instruction and command of Congress, they enforce these procedures.").
196 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
197
452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
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D.

How the Courts Should Define Final Agency Action for
Purposes of Judicial Review: The Strengths of Model 1
and the Weaknesses of Models 2 and 3
1. NEPA and the APA Require Courts to Define the Challenged
Action as an Agency's Failureto Prepare an EIS

Franklin stands for the proposition that courts do not have the
power to review the merits of a President's census report. Similarly,
according to Franklin,courts lack the authority to review the merits of
the President's NAFTA proposal. Yet, nothing in Franklinprevents a
court from reviewing an agency's independent statutory obligations
even though the President has the ultimate decisionmaking authority.
Thus, in light of Franklin,courts must determine what agency action is
"final" for purposes of providing APA review. First, this Note argues
that the correct approach is to define the challenged action as an
agency's failure to comply with its independent statutory obligations.
Second, this Note argues that the challenged agency action is "final"
once the agency has completed its decisionmaking process.' 9 8 According to this approach, courts can review an agency's failure to
abide by NEPA procedures, even though the final substantive decision
is made by the President and is unreviewable under the APA.
The language of both NEPA and the APA requires courts to define the challenged action as the agency action rather than as the underlying action. Congress wanted "all agencies of the Federal
Government" to prepare impact statements prior to implementing
proposed actions and codified this intention in NEPA.199 Similarly,
the APA allows review only of "agency action." 20 0 Plaintiffs, such as
those in Public Citizen, argued that they suffered injury from an
agency's failure to abide by NEPA's procedural mandates. They did
not argue that their injury resulted from the underlying proposalNAFTA. Plaintiffs targeted the USTR's dismissal of NEPA in this situation since the USTR's inaction left them without information regarding the environmental consequences of NAFTA.
By focusing on the agency's action, rather than the underlying
proposal, courts serve the purposes of NEPA: to require agencies to
look at the environmental consequences of their actions as early as
198 Model 1, as exemplified by District CourtJudge Richey's opinion in Public Citizen,
emphasizes that the challenged agency action is final once the agency has completed its
recommendation on the proposal, and the court need not wait for Congress to act on the
proposal. See Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 26
(D.D.C.) (emphasizing that the case law clearly dictates that "an EIS must be prepared once
such a proposal is completed and that its submission to Congress is not required") (emphasis added), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).

§

199

42 U.S.C.

200

5 U.S.C. § 704.

4332(2)(c).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:413

possible in the decisionmaking process. 20 1 In contrast, courts focusing on the underlying proposal as the challenged action do not serve
the purposes of NEPA since this method inevitably delays judicial re20 2
view until the point is moot.

2.

Models 2 and 3 Deny JudicialReview by Focusing on the
Underlying Action Rather than the Agency Action

The majority decision in Public Citizen exemplifies the circuit
court's inability to correctly identify the challenged action. Contrary
to Judge Richey's focus on the agency's failure to abide by NEPA's
mandates, the D.C. Circuit focused instead on NAFA. A careful
reading of the majority opinion demonstrates the Circuit's faulty reasoning. Throughout the opinion, it emphasized that "NAFTA is not
'final agency action.' 20 3 The focus on NAFTA, however, is misplaced.2 0 4 The appropriate question is whether the USTR's actions
satisfy the finality test so as to allow a challenge by Public Citizen. Indeed, Franklin articulates a two prong test for finality: "[I] whether
the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and [2]
whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the
205
parties."
The circuit court bypassed the important steps of identifying the
agency action and asking whether that agency has completed its decisionmaking process. This analysis would have led the circuit court to
focus on the USTR's actions.20 6 The USTR completed its decisionmaking process regarding NAFTA when it submitted the legislation to
201

See discussion supra parts I.A, IIA.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
203 5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
204 Some commentators also have incorrectly focused on NAFMA as the core to a determination of final agency action. See Gibbons, supra note 193, at 114-19.
205
112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992).
206 In order to obtain judicial review under the APA, one must challenge an action of a
federal agency. There is no reason to doubt that the USTR would meet the "federal
agency" requirement in the APA. See Barber, supranote 16, at 448 (discussing the evidence
supporting this contention). Barber reasons that the USTR has functions independent of
advising the President. She also notes that a finding of agency status for the USTR would
be consistent with congressional intent that NEPA should reach all federal decisionmaking. Id. Indeed, the district court in Public Citizen found that:
NAFTA is, in substantial part, a result of the work of the Defendant [USTR]
and therefore reviewable under the APA and the NEPA. The Defendant
Office of the United States Trade Representative is charged by statute with
the responsibility for conducting international trade negotiations, developing and coordinating United States trade policy and imposing any retaliatory trade sanctions on other countries. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2171, 2411-2417.
It is undisputed that the Defendant [USTR] has, in substantial part, negotiated and drafted the NAFTA.
822 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685
(1994).
202
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the President. 207 Having identified the USTR as the appropriate federal agency, the court should have asked whether the agency's process, or lack thereof, directly affected the aggrieved parties. By doing
so, the circuit court would have found that the USTR's failure to prepare an EIS had a direct effect on the public since the agency made its
decision without adequately examining the environmental consequences of NAFTA. NEPA's EIS serves an important informational
function to the public. By disregarding a direct statutory mandate,
the USTR failed to further Congress' purpose in enacting NEPA, and
2 08
denied the public information to which they were entitled.
One might be tempted to account for the circuit court's statement that "NAFTA is not 'final agency action' "209 as sloppy writing,
but, in actuality, the error illustrates the court's faulty approach to
answering the finality question. The court correctly noted that the
"central question . . . is whether Public Citizen has identified some

agency action that is final upon which to base APA review."2 10 However, instead of taking the logical approach of first identifying the
agency action and then asking whether it is final, the court looked
instead for the point at which the whole process is final-or completed-and identified the "agency" as the institution taking that final
step. This conceptualization of the legislative time line conveniently
allowed the court to dismiss the case by concluding that the President,
who effected the last step, was not an "agency," and thus, his action
21 1
was not reviewable under the APA.

This approach completely forecloses judicial review of an
agency's failure to abide by NEPA, because in every situation, further
action must be taken in order to implement the proposal.2 12 Following this approach insulates agency actions from judicial review and
abrogates the need for the APA, a statute that allows judicial review of
"agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
2 13

court."

207

See supra note 8.

See discussion supra part IIA.2 (discussing NEPA's purposes).
5 F.3d 549, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. deniea 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
Id. at 551.
Therefore, the court summarized its holding that the " 'final agency action' challenged in this case is the submission of NAFTA to Congress by the President... [and] the
President's actions are not 'agency action' and thus cannot be reviewed under the APA."
Id at 553.
Indeed, the court could have conceptualized the end point as Congress' approval of
NAFTA. This too would have been unacceptable, however, since the question of whether
the agency had considered the environmental effects of its proposal would have been moot
at that time. The time when the President submits the proposal to Congress and the time
when Congress passes NAFMA are both irrelevant to the determination of the judgment of
an agency decisionmaking process. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
212
See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
213 5 U.S.C. § 704.
208
209
210
211
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There is no reason to believe that when Congress included the
"final agency action" requirement of the APA it intended a procedure
that first looked for the final action and then asked whether an agency
performed such action. 214 If Congress had intended this, it would be
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to challenge agency compliance with
statutes because nonagency action is often required to institute the
agency's proposal. The circuit court in Public Citizen believed that it
sufficiently allayed these fears, however, by limiting Franklin'sapplication to those situations in which the President takes the "final step." 21 5
However, this distinction based on who submits the final proposal to
Congress, an agency or the President, is unfounded in the legislative
history of the APA.2 16 Nevertheless, according to Public Citizen, the
2 17
former is subject to judicial review while the latter is not.

Circuit Judge Randolph's analysis in his concurring opinion in
Public Citizen also demonstrates the consequences of defining the challenged action as the underlying proposal. Judge Randolph shrewdly
noted the unique dangers in the NEPA context of holding that the act
of proposing legislation does not constitute final action. He stated
that "[t]he nub of the problem is that judicial review under the APA
demands 'final agency action' whereas the duty to prepare an impact
2 18
statement arises earlier."
However, Judge Randolph did not provide an adequate answer to
this problem. Indeed, he presented an even less attractive model
when he, like the majority, characterized NAFTA as the challenged
action. Furthermore, he questioned whether a legislative proposal
could ever satisfy the Franklinfinality test. Thus, he could not imagine
that the act of proposinglegislation could ever directly affect the parties;
in fact, "no one will be affected, directly or otherwise, unless and until
Congress passes the bill and the President signs it into law." 21 9 Like
the majority, Judge Randolph's observations ignore the agency's failure to follow certain procedures during the process of proposing legislation. This failure to comply with procedural requirements
certainly affects the parties. Indeed, the failure to follow NEPA sub220
stantively affects an agency's decision.
See discussion supra part II.B.
See 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Franklinis limited to those cases in which the
President has final constitutional or statutory responsibility for the final step necessary for
the agency action directly to affect the parties."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
216
See discussion supra part II.B.
217
5 F.3d at 552.
218
Id. at 554.
219
Id. at 553-54.
220
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
("Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision,
it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process."); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364,
214
215
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In sum, adopting Model 2 or 3 will negate judicial review of an
agency's failure to comply with NEPA. By focusing on either NAFTA
or the act of proposing legislation, the two models allow the courts to
abdicate their authority of enforcing agency compliance with statutory
mandates.
3.

The Consequences of SurrenderingArticle I Powers

An interpretation of Franklin that denies judicial review of an
agency's independent statutory obligations under NEPA results in serious separation of powers problems. Ultimately, Public Citizen leaves
agency action unchecked by the judiciary, thereby upsetting the
power balance between the three branches of government.
Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts the power to
enforce agency compliance with statutory directives.22 1 There is no
reason to deny judicial enforcement of an agency's independent statutory obligations solely because the President is involved with the legislative proposal process.2 22 Courts have abandoned the "wooden
notion" that each branch must exercise a separate and discrete set of
powers and have recognized the interdependence between the
branches.2 2 3 The courts are the final arbiters of conflicts between the
executive and the legislature and play an important role in maintain2 24
ing the appropriate balance of power.
By applying Franklin to NEPA cases in a manner that exempts
agencies from judicial review of their statutory obligations, courts ignore legislative prerogative. Judicial abdication of the courts' constitutionally mandated role of enforcing Article I legislation upsets the
balance of power in favor of the Executive: it allows the Executive to
exercise uncircumscribed power. Left unchecked, the President
could rewrite the laws, thereby usurping the Article I legislative powers that rest with Congress.2 25 Since the balance of power in the ad368 (D. Colo. 1992) ("Although NEPA itself does not mandate particular results and simply prescribes the necessary process, these procedures are certain to affect the agency's
substantive decision.").
221
U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2 ("judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States").
222 See Cass P. Sunstein, Wat's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 MicH. L. REv. 163, 217-18 (1992) ("Agency rejection of congressional enactments, even if motivated by the President himself, is inconsistent with the system of separation of powers.").
223
See TRIBE, supra note 188, at 16.
224 For example, in The Federalist;Hamilton discusses the role-of the courts as an "intermediate body between the people and the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
225
U.S. CONsT. art. I. This kind of situation where the President usurps legislative
power sounds of the very "tyranny" of which James Madison warned. See THE ')FEERAuST
No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that "[t]he accumula-
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ministrative state is already one that tends to favor the Executive,
22 6
courts must check any further inflation of this power.

Finally, a strict importation of Franklin into NEPA cases, where
there is both agency and presidential action, acts essentially as ajudicial repeal of NEPA's EIS requirement on legislative proposals. Without the power of the courts looming over agencies, there is no reason
to believe that they will comply with NEPA.2 27 Indeed, because Article

II grants the President constitutional power to submit legislation to
Congress on behalf of the Executive Branch, all executive agencies
could avoid the statutorily required EIS by submitting their proposals
through the President. 228 This sort of collusion between the administrative agencies and the President usurps legislative power by ignoring
the purpose of a congressional statute.
In sum, the courts should be wary of abdicating their power to
review agency action for failure to comply with statutory mandates.
Judicial abstention in cases pertaining to an agency's obligation to
prepare an EIS for a proposal that will ultimately be reviewed and
submitted to Congress by the President will tilt the balance of power
among the three branches toward the Executive.

tion of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
226 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the AdministrativeState,89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 527 (1989) (arguing that the courts should "recognize the constant tendency of regulatory power to flow, centripetally, towards the head of
the executive branch and think deliberately and carefully about where to find counterbalance for this tendency").
227
See Public Citizen Cert. Petition, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that "because the President has the constitutional power to submit legislation to Congress on behalf of the Executive Branch .... it appears likely that no legislative EISs would ever be judicially reviewable
under the decision below").
Judge Randolph, however, disagreed with the notion that the lack ofjudicial review of
agency action would translate into noncompliance with NEPA. In his concurrence in Public Citizen, he remarked that "there is a big difference between saying that APA review is
unavailable and saying that officials do not have to comply with NEPA when they suggest
legislation." 5 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denie, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). He argues
that Congress can act as an enforcer of the statute by refusing to consider an agency's
proposal if it has not incorporated an EIS. Id. Yet, he gives too much credit to Congress'
ability to notice that an agency has not prepared an EIS and has neglected important
environmental considerations. There is a plethora of legislation governing agency actions
and it would be impossible for Congress to keep up with all violations. Ultimately, the
public, by challenging an agency action, and the courts, by hearing these challenges, play
an important role in checking agency compliance with various statutory mandates. The
application of Franklinin Public Citizen was a significant constraint on the opportunity to
review the USTR's actions on behalf of the public interest. Indeed, Congress passed
NAFTA without giving much thought to the USTR's failure to prepare an EIS before submitting its proposal to the President.
228 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
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The application of the Franklinfinality test in Public Citizen sounds
the death knell of NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement on legislative proposals. Two decades of NEPA precedent have
established plaintiffs' rights to seek judicial review of an agency's failure to prepare an EIS on legislative proposals. These cases enforced
the statutory requirement that all agencies prepare an EIS for "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation ... signifi2 29 Unfortucantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
nately, Public Citizen eviscerated the legislative proposal prong
whenever the agency action involves the President at any point in the
proposal process.
At first glance, Franklinstands for the uncontroversial proposition
that courts cannot review actions involving presidential discretion
under the APA- This simple proposition has been expanded, however, to cases where an agency has independent statutory obligations
that must be fulfilled before the proposal is either reviewed or submitted to Congress by the President. Denying review of a challenge to an
agency's failure to comply with its independent statutory obligations
frustrates the purposes of NEPA. The Supreme Court should protect
the role of the judiciary in policing agency compliance with NEPA's
EIS requirement on legislative proposals and remind courts that their
involvement should come at an early stage in the decisionmaking process, thereby fulfilling the purpose of NEPA.
Case law does not clearly define the finality doctrine in NEPA
cases. Congress should make clear its intent to have the courts police
agency compliance with NEPA's EIS requirement on both major federal actions and legislative proposals. The courts should not hesitate
to fulfill congressional intent. No justification exists for the proposition that courts do not have the power to hear cases alleging an
agency's failure to comply with NEPA's statutory mandates solely because the President plays some role in the legislative process. Courts
should not hide behind the timing doctrines as a convenient escape
from making difficult decisions. Furthermore, the finality requirement should not pose a problem because an agency's violation of
NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS on a legislative proposal is a final
agency action. The agency's failure to consider the environmental
consequences of its proposed action during the decisionmaking process is a flagrant violation of NEPA and one that directly affects all
citizens. By ignoring this agency inaction, courts mock the nation's
first federal environmental policy act and ignore the intent of Congress in passing NEPA.
229

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
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Having identified a problem in the application of Franklinto the
NEPA realm, this Note presents a plea to the Supreme Court to resolve the present inconsistencies. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, leaving the future of NEPA's EIS requirement on legislative
proposals questionable.
Silvia L. Serp

t
The author would like to thank Patti Goldman for extensive comments and insightful discussions during the preparation of this Note. Any errors are, of course, the
author's own.
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